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http://www.jstor.orgPOWER RELATIONS IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS* 
BARRY MARKOVSKY  DAVID  WILLER 
University  of Iowa  University  of Kansas 
TRAVIS PATTON 
University  of Kansas 
Many theories address the problem of how a social structure  affects the experiences and 
behaviors of  its  members. This paper  offers a  network-exchange  theory to  solve  this 
problem. Previous research has shown that the nature  and outcomes of negotiations  among 
individual  or corporate actors can be inferred  from their network  positions. The impact of 
this research has been limited because its theory does not enable the researcher to locate 
power positions in the networks. We  offer a theory  that is both consistent  with all previously 
reported experimental  research and is generalized to conditions not considered by other 
formulations. In addition to supporting derived hypotheses pertaining to network-based 
power, our experiments  demonstrate, among other things, that certain unstable networks 
break down to form stable substructures  and that some networks  contain overlapping but 
autonomous  domains of power and exchange. 
Although no  single exchange theory domi- 
nates the  social  sciences,  a  fairly coherent 
social-exchange perspective exists.  In  this 
perspective, social  structures and processes 
impinge on  and emerge from resource and 
sanction transfers  between individuals and/or 
collectivities.'  Recently, some theories have 
moved beyond two-party exchange contexts 
to focus on networks of exchange relations. 
As structural  theories, network-exchange  the- 
ories attempt  to explain how macro-properties 
bear  upon  micro-units  within  structures. 
Concretely, they try to  show how  network 
structures  affect the power of actors  to extract 
valued  resources  in  their  exchanges  with 
others. 
* Direct  all  correspondence to  Barry  Markovsky, 
Department  of Sociology, The University of Iowa, Iowa 
City, IA 52242. 
The authors  thank  David Diekema, Cecilia Ridgeway, 
Robin Stryker, and two anonymous ASR reviewers for 
their  comments  on  an  earlir  verscin  of  thk  naner 
We propose and test a theory that predicts 
relative power for network positions. In so 
doing, we address  several structural  phenom- 
ena,  including  the  breakdown  of  larger 
networks into  smaller parts and the emer- 
gence of  positions that simultaneously have 
one level of power in one part of the network 
and a different  level in another.  Our theory is 
further intended to provide higher levels  of 
rigor, power, and specificity than are found in 
earlier approaches. We  find that each such 
technical advancement produces a manifold 
increase in the array  of potential  applications. 
Whenever a  person or  group negotiates 
with  another  person  or  group  over  the 
allocation of  valued  resources,  a  minimal 
social-exchange network exists. More elabo- 
rate (i.e.,  nondyadic) structures  form when 
one member is involved in two or more such 
relations. For example, college  students Al, 
Bea, and Cleo each want to date, and norms 
prohibit them  from  dating more than one 
person at a time. Suppose that Bea and Cleo 
both vie for Al's attention  and have no other 
prospects, while Al would be happy to date 
either Bea  or  Cleo.  This  creates a  B-A-C 
network, where A(1)  may "negotiate" with 
B(ea) and C(leo), but only date one of them. 
Such  circumstances  actually  do  tip  the 
balance of  power (Peplau 1979)  in  dating 
relations:  A is able to make greater  demands 
than his  chosen partner, and generally has 
greater  influence in the relationship.  But if B 
or C develop dating interests with a respon- 
sive D, A loses his structural  advantage. 
1 Theoretical  statements  have  been  provided  by 
Thibaut  and Kelley (1959), Blau (1964), Gergen (1969), 
Homans  (1974), Ekeh (1974), Heath (1976), Blalock and 
Wilken (1979),  Burgess and Huston (1979),  and Cook 
(1987). Emerson (1976), Bredemeier  (1978), and Tuner 
(1986)  have  written reviews.  Applications involving 
ethnographic, institutional, and historical analyses are 
provided by  Polanyi  (1944),  Elkin  (1953),  Sahlins 
(1972), Earle and Ericson (1977), and Emerson (1981). 
Recent  applications of  network-exchange theories  to 
interorganizational relations,  backward  and  forward 
integration  of  the firm, community structure, historical 
development of  modem  exchange  relations,  and  ex- 
change  processes  in  antiquity are  given  by  Hansen 
(1981),  Loukinen (1981), Gilham (1981), Galaskiewicz 
(1985), Skinner and Guiltinan  (1986), Lind (1987), and 
Willer (1987). 
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This type of analysis is applicable  in other 
areas such as international,  auctioneer-bidder, 
retailer-consumer, and  manufacturer-retailer 
relations. A good example is the control  that  a 
manufacturer  may impose upon retailer mar- 
keting  strategies  (Skinner  and  Guiltinan 
1986). Suppose Ascii Ugetty (A) is the sole 
manufacturer  of  a line of  computer games. 
Big Bytes (B),  Chips-R-Down (C) and Data 
Dump (D) are independent  retailers  that want 
to carry the line. Even with fixed wholesale 
prices, A's position affords it power over B, 
C,  and D.  Skinner and Guiltinan found that 
retailer  activities such as advertising  expendi- 
tures, sales force training, and credit policies 
were under manufacturer  control to a greater 
extent  when  retailers  had  no  alternative 
suppliers.  So if D can obtain the product  from 
E-Z Access (E), A loses its ability to control 
D's policies. A may have to "outbid" E just 
to keep D's business. 
Our purpose is to understand  the structural 
logic  manifested in  all  such exchange net- 
works-a  logic  unbounded  by  empirical 
content. If the experiences of actors depend 
on their positions, this suggests a structural 
determination  of  behavior. At  issue  in  this 
paper is the logic of that determination. 
AN EARLIER  APPROACH 
Recent work by Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, 
and Yamagishi (1983) clearly overlaps with 
our own in scope.2 They showed that their 
approach  could anticipate  power distributions 
in  some  cases  where  alternative measures 
failed. Based on Emerson (1972b),  Cook et 
al. (1983) defined Exchange network  as 
(1) a set of actors  (either  natural  persons  or 
corporate  groups),  (2) a distribution  of valued 
resources  among  those  actors,  (3) for  each  actor 
a set of exchange  opportunities  with  other  actors 
in  the  network, (4)  a  set  of  historically 
developed  and utilized  exchange  opportunities 
called exchange  relations,  and (5)  a  set of 
network  connections  linking  exchange  relations 
into  a single  network  structure.  (p. 277) 
The set of exchange relations is a subset of 
exchange  opportunities, and  actors  in  the 
system  are  assumed  to  be  committed to 
exchanging  within  their  relations,  to  the 
exclusion  of  alternative opportunities. The 
concept of connection permits  networks  to be 
considered  from relations. Formally 
Two  exchange  relations  between  actors  A-B and 
actors  A-C are connected  to form  the minimal 
network  B-A-C  to the degree  that  exchange  in 
one relation is  contingent  on  exchange (or 
nonexchange)  in the other relation. (a) The 
connection  is positive  if exchange  in one  relation 
is contingent  on exchange  in the other.  (b) The 
connection  is  negative if  exchange in  one 
relation  is contingent  on nonexchange  in the 
other.  (p. 277) 
A negative connection exists if B and C can 
substitute  as providers  of A's resources. The 
authors  cite as examples dating  and friendship 
networks. In the case of  a positive connec- 
tion,  A  cannot benefit  without exchanges 
from B and C. This is true if A is a brokerage 
agent,  or  if  B  and  C  are  assembly-line 
workers who must exchange their labor for 
pay before the firm (A) can benefit. 
Cook et al. (1983 define power as "In any 
dyadic exchange relation  Ax;By  (where A and 
B  are  actors,  and  x  and  y  are resources 
introduced  in exchange), the power of A over 
B  is  the potential of  A  to obtain favorable 
outcomes at B's  expense" (p.  284).  Depen- 
dence is given as: "The dependence of A on 
B  in  a  dyadic exchange relation is  a joint 
function (1) varying directly  with the value of 
y  to A,  and (2)  varying inversely with the 
availability  of y to A from alternate  sources" 
(pp. 284-85). 
By informally applying power-dependence 
ideas, Cook et al. developed several hypoth- 
eses predicting  relative power for positions in 
several types  of  negatively connected net- 
works.  Toward the  end  of  the  paper,  a 
network vulnerability (V)  method was  sug- 
gested  as  a  first  step  toward  a  formal 
procedure for  predicting positions'  relative 
power. 
To  determine V  for the B-A-C network, 
assume that related actors negotiate over the 
division  of  24  resource  points,  and  a 
one-exchange rule creates the negative con- 
nection: A may exchange with B or C but not 
both in a given round. First, the maximum 
resource flow  (MRF)  for  the  network is 
calculated.  MRF  =  24  since,  by  the 
one-exchange rule,  only  24  points may be 
distributed  per round. Next, the reduction in 
2  Comparisons  among these theories are hindered by 
their lack of  explicit scope conditions. Although some 
scope conditions can be inferred, at times it is not clear 
when  theories are  competitors (Wagner and  Berger, 
1985) with divergent predictions testable in  the same 
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Fig.  1 
maximum flow (RMF) is calculated for each 
position by noting the effect of its removal on 
MRF. If B or C is removed, RMF =  0, since 
A  may  still  exchange  with  the  other. 
However, RMFA =  24. The network is then 
most vulnerable at A,  and A  is  declared a 
power node. 
Discussion 
This general approach  has been corroborated 
in several experiments, including those pub- 
lished  by  Cook  et  al.  (1983),  Stolte  and 
Emerson (1977),  and  Cook  and  Emerson 
(1978). However, V has not been systemati- 
cally tested. Moreover, Willer (1986) deter- 
mined that V produces untenable  predictions 
for some relatively simple networks such as 
that in Figure la.  V predicts high power for 
B,  D,  and  E.  But  under Cook  et  al.'s 
experimental conditions, high  profit for  D 
would entail low  profit for B,  E,  or both. 
Although Cook,  Gillmore,  and  Yamagishi 
(1986)  described V  as only  "a preliminary 
notion,"  it  still  provided the  only  explicit 
basis  for  deriving hypotheses. Without it, 
predictions  were  informal  and  not  fully 
determined  by the theory. 
Cook et al. (1986, p. 447) later proposed  a 
modified V-measure. Network-wide depen- 
dence (DN) weighs a position's RMF by the 
factor (1 -  CRMF), where CRMF is "no. of 
lines that need to be removed [for a position] 
to exercise power at its potential" divided by 
the number  of lines connected  to the position. 
By  this measure, B  in Figure 1 has higher 
power than  D, and D higher  power than  A, C, 
and E.  Although these predictions are tena- 
ble,  they diverge from test results reported 
later in  this  paper and their derivation is 
indeterminate.3 
Many  of  Cook  et  al.'s  methodological 
choices  were  neither necessitated nor pre- 
cluded by their theory. For instance, negotia- 
tions took place over a series of rounds;  each 
relation had its own resource pool; each pool 
was replenished  before every round;  exchange 
consisted of  mutually agreed on pool  divi- 
sions;  there was  a  one-exchange rule; re- 
sources  did  not  move  through positions; 
coalitions were prohibited;  and actors had no 
information on  negotiations in  which  they 
were  not  directly  involved.  At  issue  is 
whether  the  approach  might  have  been 
falsified  under  alternative  methodological 
conditions. Later we  demonstrate that very 
different results are obtained under slightly 
different  conditions. 
A GRAPH-ANALYTIC  THEORY 
In his recent elaboration  on the work of Cook 
and her associates, Marsden  (1987) succinctly 
offered as unsolved problems several of the 
implications that may  be  drawn from our 
theory: 
The difficulty  in developing  a more general 
measure  is that  an  alternative  [exchange  partner] 
may  be exploitable  for  two  reasons:  It may  have 
few alternative  relations,  or all of its alternatives 
(irrespective  of how many  in all are available) 
may be in a position  to exploit others. The 
second  condition  of exploitability  can lead to 
consideration  of quite  distal  features  of network 
structure.  (p. 147, note  5) 
Building on an earlier exchange formual- 
tion  (Willer  and  Anderson  1981;  Willer 
1987),  our  graph-analytic approach recog- 
nizes  both  types  of  "exploitability" and 
3Using  their model, we could not reproduce  Cook et 
al.'s  predictions. The authors stated "This measure is 
relevant  only when RMF is not zero" (p. 447). But RMF 
=  0  for  positions A  and C,  apparently making DN 
inapplicable.  Further,  the expression "exercise power at 
its potential"  is not defined, and it is not stated whether 
the removed  lines must stem from the position whose DN 
is being assessed. Following the Cook et al. examples, it 
appears that in  the  I  a  network, two  lines  must be 
removed  from B to reduce  the maximum  flow of network 
resources,  and one relation  must  be removed  from D. The 
result is CRMFB =  I/3,  CRMFD =  ?/2, DNB  =  8,  and 
DND  =  12. D  should be higher than B,  contradicting 
Cook et al.'s  prediction. In either case, the predictions 
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specifies conditions under which distal net- 
work properties will  or  will  not  influence 
proximal outcomes. We first present  p(l),  an 
index for power in one-exchange networks. 
This allows us to test our predictions  against 
those of Cook et al. (1983,  1986). Following 
this,  p(e),  a  generalized version,  will  be 
explicated and tested. 
Conditions  of Exchange 
Power and resource distributions  are affected 
not only by network shapes, but also by the 
conditions under which exchanges transpire. 
The theory provides scope statements  encom- 
passing relatively broad conditions, some of 
which are later  relaxed, others of which await 
future  tests, theoretical  extensions, and  refine- 
ments. Scope conditions are not assumptions 
about human  nature  or frequencies  of empiri- 
cal circumstances. They are statements  that, 
if  satisfied (or  approximated), commit the 
theory to  critical examination and,  if  not 
satisfied, relieve it of any explanatory  imper- 
ative (Walker  and Cohen 1985). 
Several important concepts must first be 
defined: actors are decision-making entities, 
e.g.,  organisms, collectivities, or even com- 
puter programs. Positions are network loca- 
tions occupied by actors. A relation between 
two positions is an exchange opportunity  for 
actors in  those  positions.  In  short, actors 
occupy positions  linked by  relations.4 We 
will  index both actors and positions using 
uppercase letters and at times refer to them 
interchangeably. 
Actor Conditions. Four conditions delimit 
actors' behavior: (1) all actors use identical 
strategies  in negotiating  exchanges; (2) actors 
consistently excluded from exchanges raise 
their offers; (3) those consistently included in 
exchanges lower their  offers; (4) actors  accept 
the  best  offer  they  receive,  and  choose 
randomly  in deciding among tied best offers. 
Condition 1, requiring  identical strategies, 
is  nearly always implicit in exchange theo- 
ries. In tests and applications, however, it is 
generally  sufficient  that  actors  adopt  function- 
ally  similar  strategies.  Condition  1  also 
asserts that actors negotiate, i.e.,  they make 
offers and adjust their subsequent offers in 
light of  counter-offers they receive.  Condi- 
tions 2 and 3 require  that actors seek to enter 
exchange if  previously denied,  and to  im- 
prove  outcomes  beyond  those  previously 
obtained. Finally,  condition 4  rules  out  a 
range of  strategies that may  drive up  the 
offers of excluded parties.5 
Position Conditions. These apply to posi- 
tions and their relations: (5) each position is 
related to,  and seeks exchange with, one or 
more other positions; (6)  at the start of  an 
exchange round, equal pools  of  positively 
valued resource units are available in every 
relation; (7) two positions receive resources 
from their common pool if and only if they 
exchange; (8) each position exchanges with at 
most one other position per round. 
Since isolates cannot exchange, Condition 
5 omits them from consideration.  Condition  6 
reflects conditions in most prior research: a 
pool of profit points resides in every relation 
and  is  replenished with  each  new  round. 
Condition  7 indicates that two actors will not 
exchange unless both benefit. Condition 8, 
relaxed  later, asserts  that  actors  may complete 
at most one exchange per round. This creates 
negative connections in a way consistent with 
all previously cited experimental  research  and 
Cook et al.'s  (1983) simulations. It assumes 
that, for whatever  reasons, actors  only require 
a  single  exchange,  or  are  only  able  or 
permitted  to complete a single exchange in a 
given round.6 
The Graph-theoretic  Power Index 
Building upon simple arithmetic  procedures, 
our graph-theoretic  power index (GPI) deter- 
4 The reason for distinguishing  actors and positions is 
that  actor  properties (e.g.,  decision  strategies) and 
position properties  (e.g.,  number  of relations)  may affect 
power independently  (Markovsky  1987a). 
5 These conditions  allow a variety  of more determinate 
rational  or quasi-rational  strategies. For example, resis- 
tance  theory  (Heckathorn 1980;  Willer  1981,  1987) 
provides an elegant model of joint-bargaining  decision- 
making. Resistance is  given as the ratio of  an actor's 
interest in  gaining  a  better exchange  to  interest in 
avoiding conflict. The conditions do, however, rule out 
strategies  such  as  coalition  formation  (Kahan  and 
Rapoport 1984; Shubik 1982; Willer 1987),  in  which 
some actors temporarily  accept reduced resources while 
receiving increasingly  favorable  offers from others. 
6 We treat  negative connection the same way as Cook 
et  al.  (1983),  but diverge from Emerson's (1972a,b) 
original usage (Willer, Markovsky,  and Patton  forthcom- 
ing). In the earlier  formulation,  for an actor  with multiple 
relations, exchange in one reduces the value of exchange 
in others  because the actor's satiation  level increases  with 
each  exchange.  Exchange  rates  across  the  actor's 
relations  are  then  negatively  correlated, but  as  an 
outcome of  the  exchange  process,  not  as  an  initial 
condition. 224  AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
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mines relative power for all positions in any 
network  that meets the scope conditions.7  As 
also  implied in  the work of  Kuhn (1974), 
Cook  et  al.  (1983),  Bonacich  (1987a), 
Marsden (1983,  1987) and others, power is 
assumed to  derive from the  availability of 
alternative  exchange  relations,  the unavailabil- 
ity of their relations' alternative  relations, and 
so  on.  Power  is  then  conceived  as  an 
unobservable, structurally  determined  poten- 
tial for obtaining  relatively favorable  resource 
levels. Power use, as manifested in resource 
distributions,  serves as an indicator  of power. 
So while we theorize about potential power, 
we test our theory by observing its use. 
The  procedure for  determining GPI  in- 
volves counting path lengths. Thus, network 
B-A-C has two one-paths, A-B and A-C. B 
and C are linked by a two-path. As explained 
below, path counting is greatly simplified by 
only counting the number of nonintersecting 
paths of each length stemming from a given 
position.  Nonintersecting paths  stemming 
from position X have only X in common. In 
Figure 2,  for example, three nonintersecting 
two-paths  stem  from  D,  but  only  one 
nonintersecting  two-path  stems from El (con- 
necting with either E2 or E3). 
An implication of this procedure  is that it 
does not matter for X whether a position m 
steps away "branches"  to one or a hundred 
positions m + 1 steps away. All that  matters  is 
whether  or not there is a position m + 1 steps 
from X.  This is a subtle, possibly nonintui- 
tive, but incontrovertible  assertion  within our 
framework.  The following example therefore 
bears careful study. 
Imagine  removing  A and C from the Figure 
la  network.  D  benefits  greatly  from  the 
resulting three-actor  chain: B and E must try 
to  engage D,  offering ever more favorable 
deals to D.  Now restore A.  B  now has an 
alternative  to bidding against E. But with B 
not  bidding against E,  D's  advantage dis- 
solves. Although  still with two alternatives,  D 
cannot  play B and E against  each other and so 
all positions are on  an equal footing. Now 
restore C. B now benefits because A and C 
will try to outbid  each other  for B's exchange. 
This presents no further  disadvantage  for D, 
however, who may still exchange with E on 
an equal basis. 
Note  that A  and C  are on  intersecting 
two-paths from D.  The creation of  one  of 
those two-paths changed the minimum rela- 
tive  power  in  D's  relations from  high  to 
equal. But the creation of the second two-path 
had no effect on this minimum.  If we further 
attached F,  G,  and H  to position B,  these 
added two-paths from D will still not affect 
the minimum relative power that D  would 
enjoy. This shows why only one nonintersect- 
ing path of a given length is counted. 
It may now be apparent  that  X's odd-length 
nonintersecting  paths are advantageous, and 
even-length nonintersecting  paths are disad- 
vantageous. Advantageous  paths either pro- 
vide direct exchange alternatives  (in the case 
of  one-paths), or counteract the advantage- 
robbing  effects of disadvantageous  paths. 
The  GPI  simply  tallies  the  number of 
advantageous  paths and subtracts  the number 
of disadvantageous  paths to determine each 
position's potential power. 
Position i's  GPI under the one-exchange 
condition is calculated  as8 
g 
P(li  =1  (-l)lk  ')Mik 
k= 1 
mil  -  mi2  +  mi3 
-mi4  +  .  .  * +mg  (1) 
and i's power relative to j is 
p(Oij  =  p(l)i  -  P(l)j. 
The function  (_  1)(k- 1) produces +  signs for 
advantageous  paths  and -  signs for disadvan- 
tageous paths. These are attached  to the mik 
values-the  number of position i's  noninter- 
secting paths of length k. For now we may 
7See  Harary,  Norman, and Cartwright  (1965), Harary 
(1969), and Fararo  (1973) for discussions of a variety of 
graph-theoretic  tools. 
8 Readers  familiar  with our unpublished  reports  should 
note that we  have referred to  this measure as  CN(i), 
position i's  centrality when allowed N exchanges. The 
present notation more accurately reflects our concern 
with power rather than centrality and adheres to  the 
convention of displaying variable  indices and parameters 
as, respectively, subscripts  and parenthetical  elements. POWER  IN NETWORKS  225 
suppress the number-of-exchanges  parameter 
for p(l),  and refer to the index simply as pi. 
The values for g and the ms are obtained  as 
follows: 
mi1 is the number of  one-paths stemming 
from position i, which is the same as the 
number  of i's relations. In Figure la, for 
example, MD1  =  2. 
Mi2  is  the  number  of  nonintersecting 
two-paths  from i. As shown in the earlier 
example, D has only one nonintersecting 
two-path, so MD2  =  1. 
mi3  is  the  number  of  nonintersecting 
three-paths  stemming from i; mD3  =  0- 
The largest path of length k for which Mik 
>  0  is  the geodesic (g) of  the network. In 
Figure la,  three-paths  link A to E, and C to 
E, hence, g  =  3. 
The final step is to combine the miks: take 
mi1, subtract  mi2,  add mi3,  and so on. We find 
thatpD =  2  -  1 +  0  =  1. Figure lb shows 
this value and the pi values for the other four 
positions.9 
Axioms and Theorems 
The formal statement  of our theory appears  in 
the Appendix to this paper. In the statements 
below,  "power" refers to Pij, with i  and j 
related. 
AXIOM 1: given by equation (1) above. 
AXIOM 2: i seeks exchange with j if and 
only if i's power is greater  than  j's,  or if 
i's power relative to j equals or exceeds 
that in any of i's other relations. 
AXIOM 3: i  and j  can exchange only if 
each seeks exchange with the other. 
AXIOM 4.  if  i  and j  exchange,  then i 
receives  more resources than j  if  and 
only if i has more power than  j. 
In Axiom  2,  "i  seeks  exchange with j" 
means that i  makes competitive offers to j, 
i.e.,  offers that compete with others that j 
receives. A more psychological interpretation 
would be  "i  makes offers  that j  seriously 
considers." The axiom first claims that this 
occurs if i's power is greater  than  j's. Further, 
even if i's power is less than j's,  i will seek 
exchange with j if i's relative power is even 
lower in its other  relations.  10  Note that  Axiom 
3  does  not  imply  that  two  actors  will 
exchange if  they  seek  exchange with each 
other; actors may negotiate without exchang- 
ing.  Finally, Axiom 4  asserts that potential 
power determines  the use of power, i.e.,GPI 
predicts final resource distributions. 
Some of the theorems that can be derived 
from these axioms include 
Theorem 1: If i has no alternative  relations, 
then i seeks exchange with j. 
Theorem 2:  If  i  does not seek exchange 
with j or if j does not seek exchange with 
i, then i and j do not exchange. 
Theorem  3: Actor i does not seek exchange 
with j if and only if i's power is less than 
or  equal  to  j's  and  i  has  a  better 
alternative  to j. 
Theorem 4:  If  i's  power is  less  than or 
equal to j's and i has a better alternative 
to j, or if j's power is less than or equal 
to i's and j has a better alternative  to i, 
then i and j will not exchange. 
More intuitively, Theorem 1 claims that an 
actor in a position with only one relation  will 
seek exchange via that relation, whatever its 
relative power. Theorem  2 is a logical variant 
of  Axiom  3.  Theorem  3  specifies  the 
conditions under  which an actor will not seek 
exchange via one of its relations. Theorem 4 
predicts when a network will break at the i-j 
relation. It reveals that certain relations are 
expected  to  remain unused,  leading  some 
9 Exchange in one relation  will often temporarily  alter 
the relative power of nearby positions. This dynamic is 
captured  through  an iterative application  of the GPI. In 
Figure 2,  for  example,  pi  is  first  calculated for  all 
positions in the network. In a given round  of negotiation, 
if  El  and F1 exchange first, pi is  recalculated for the 
network  with El and F1 removed. The new pi values are 
then in force until the next exchange occurs or until the 
end  of  the  round. In  the  relatively simple networks 
examined in this paper, initial  pi values provide accurate 
predictions for power use. In more complex networks, 
however, the iterative  application  of the GPI is required 
to obtain accurate predictions (Markovsky, Willer, and 
Patton 1987). 
10 After a sufficiently  extended  series of exchanges, an 
actor with p  =  0  should seek exchange in all  of  its 
relations, regardless of  power differences. That is,  to 
avoid complete  exclusion, the actor  will offer to keep just 
one resource  unit and relinquish  the balance  of the pool to 
any other that is  willing  to  exchange. This seems to 
violate  Axiom  2;  however,  this  actor  is  no  longer 
engaged  in  negotiation. This  violates  the  first  actor 
condition and makes the  theory inapplicable. This  is 
hardly a  limitation of  the theory, however,  for when 
exchanges  reach  this  point  of  non-negotiability, the 
system (or subsystem)  has run its course, exchange rates 
will remain fixed, and the theory is "finished" with its 
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complex networks  to break  apart  into smaller, 
stable  subnetworks. When  such  a  break 
occurs, power indices are recalculated  within 
the  resulting subnetworks. This  is  demon- 
strated  in some of the applications  below. 
Applications 
We  have  applied  the  GPI,  axioms,  and 
theorems to a large number of  networks of 
varying shape and size. This small sampling 
demonstrates  the use of the theory. 
For the A-B  dyad, PA  =  PB  =  1.  No 
position has a structural  advantage.  The same 
is true  for positions on any even-length  chain, 
as verified in computer simulation research 
(Markovsky  1987b). In general, however, the 
longer the chain, the more rounds transpire 
before the predicted  power relations  stabilize. 
For the B-A-C network,  PB  =  Pc  =  1 -  1 
=  0  and PA  =  2  -  0  =  2.  A's  power 
advantage  is 2 in both of its relations, while 
PBA  =  PCA  =  -2.  In fact, for odd-length 
chains of any length, p =  2 for even positions 
and p  =  0  for  odd  positions; low-  and 
high-power  positions alternate.  This conforms 
with Cook et al.'s predictions  and experimen- 
tal results for the five-position chain and with 
our computer  simulations  for longer chains." 
Similarly, in Figure 2, PF  =  1 -  1 +  1 -  1 
=  0, PE =  2  -  1 +  1 =  2, and  PD =  3  - 
3  =  0.  Thus the center and periphery  have 
low power, and the off-center positions have 
high power. This also conforms with Cook et 
al.'s predictions  and simulation  results. 
Returning to  Figure  1,  we  find  that  a 
decomposition is predicted. Figure lb  shows 
the pi values as initially calculated. Applying 
Theorem 4,  however, since D's index is less 
than  B's, and since E is a "better"  alternative 
for  D  (because PE  <  PB),  D  and B  are 
predicted  not to exchange. Finally, Figure Ic 
shows the final pi values recalculated  for the 
resulting subnetworks. 
EXPERIMENT  1 
Since  the  scope  of  our theory appears to 
overlap with that of Cook et al., we compare 
our predictions  with those derived from their 
measure. We  tested the Figure 1 network. 
Based  on  our analysis,  D-E  will  form an 
equal  power  dyad,  the  B-D  relation will 
break, and B will have power over A and C. 
In contrast, Cook et al. (1986) order B  >  D 
>  (A, C, E) with no breaks predicted. 
Method 
Subjects  were  undergraduates at  a  large 
university. Before being taken to the labora- 
tory, participants  in a given session met as a 
group, received written instructions,  and had 
any  questions  answered.  In  the  research 
room, connections among network positions 
were clearly marked and, to limit collusion, 
temporary  barriers  separated  positions among 
which exchange was prohibited. The setting 
minimally restricted  the availability of infor- 
mation about the structure  and the actions of 
others.  12 
Twenty-four  counters  were placed between 
related  positions. These served as resources  to 
be divided by mutual  agreement,  each valued 
at one profit point and worth 3 cents. Each 
position was  limited to  one  agreement per 
round. Before starting, we  emphasized that 
exchanges  could  only  occur  by  mutual 
agreement between  related  positions,  and 
long-term strategies  were prohibited. 
Experiments were  organized by  rounds, 
periods, and sessions.  In all,  five  sessions 
were  run,  each  with  a  different group of 
subjects. There were five periods per session, 
allowing each subject  to occupy each position 
for one period before the session was over. 
Each  period  contained  four  negotiation  rounds, 
each  with  a  three-minute time  limit.  Each 
position's scores were announced  after every 
round. At the close of a session, participants 
were paid according  to points they obtained- 
around $5.00  on  the  average. This  design 
produced  a total of 100 rounds  of negotiation. 
Hypotheses 
Below  we  present hypotheses derived from 
our theory, those obtained  from Cook et al.'s 
(1986) DN  procedure, and the null hypothe- 
ses. 
1. Our  theory  predicts  that the network  will 
break at the  B-D  relation, eliminating ex- 
1  Cook et al. had a "low profit" relation  between the 
two end-points of the chain. While this places a lower 
limit on the profit  that  these positions can receive, it does 
not affect the relative power of positions in this network. 
12 Having information  on negotiations  other  than  one's 
own is expected to accelerate the use of power, but not 
affect relative power. For a more extended discussion of 
information  effects, see Willer and Markovsky  (1986). POWER  IN NETWORKS  227 
Table 1.  First Experiment:  Profit by Position 
Position  Test 
Session  E  D  A  B  C  t*  p 
1  12.55  11.42  4.29  19.10  5.09  7.85  <.0005 
2  12.45  11.58  8.56  15.33  8.25  2.01  <.025 
3  12.00  12.00  3.29  20.95  3.29  3.50  <.0005 
4  12.05  11.95  3.75  21.55  3.75  11.15  <.0005 
5  11.80  12.20  4.17  19.16  4.17  5.77  <.0005 
* The reported  tests are for position B's actual profit points versus the null hypothesis of 12 profit points. 
change between B  and D.  DN  provides no 
hypothesis  in  this  regard.  In  contrast,  if 
exchanges  are distributed randomly in  the 
network, B  will  turn to D  one-third of  the 
time, but half of those times D will turn  to E. 
The null hypothesis, then, predicts .333  x 
.500  x  100 =  16.667 exchanges between B 
and D. 
2. B will exercise power over A and C, so 
B will receive more points per exchange than 
A and C. The DN  hypothesis also predicts B 
>  (A,C).  The  null  hypothesis predicts no 
difference  in the point accumulations  of B, A, 
and C. 
3.  The GPI indicates that D  and E have 
equal power,  and so  should have  a  12-12 
division of  points. DN  predicts that D  will 
obtain higher profits than E.  Our prediction 
can be  falsified either by  D  >  E,  as  DN 
predicts, or by E >  D. 
4. E's profits will exceed those of A and C 
since E is in an equipower  dyad and the others 
are low-power positions. The DN  and null 
hypotheses  predict  no profit  differences  among 
E, A, and C. 
Results 
In  100 negotiation rounds across five  ses- 
sions, only three exchanges occurred  between 
B  and  D. 13  The  difference  between  this 
number  and the null hypothesis  of 16.667 was 
assessed with the z-test for proportions.  The 
result,  z  =  3.666,  p  <  .0003,  supports 
Hypothesis 1 and refutes the null hypothesis. 
Table  1  shows  the  average number of 
points per session for each position. B clearly 
obtained favorable exchange  rates,  above 
19-5 in all but one session. The t-tests show 
that in every session, B's  mean profits were 
significantly  above 12 (and, by necessity, A's 
and  C's  significantly  below).  The  null 
hypothesis is rejected and Hypothesis 2 and 
the DN  prediction  are supported. 
Table 1 shows that the mean D-E exchange 
rates for each session differed only slightly 
from the 12-12 split; t-tests indicate that none 
of these differences was statistically signifi- 
cant.  Therefore, Hypothesis 3  is  also  con- 
firmed and the DN  hypotheses rejected. 
As for Hypothesis 4,  the mean point total 
for position E was 12.12, A's was 4.81,  and 
C's was 4.91.  Combining session means for 
the latter  two positions and testing against  E's 
scores,  t  =  7.522,  p  <  .0005.  Hypothesis  4 
is supported  and the null and DN  hypotheses 
refuted. 
In sum, this study provided strong support 
for the p(l)  measure as tested against its null 
hypotheses  and  the  revised  vulnerability 
measure. In the next section we present  p(e), 
a generalization  for multi-exchange  networks, 
that is,  networks in which actors exchange 
more than once per round. 
DOMAINS OF POWER  AND 
MULTI-EXCHANGE  NETWORKS 
Identifying  Domains 
The  concept  of  domain  simplifies  GPI 
calculations  in multi-exchange  networks. Do- 
mains are  independent  subnetworks  -indepen- 
dent in the sense that structural  changes in 
one cannot affect power in another. 
First, let  e  be  the  maximum number of 
unique  exchanges that  positions can make in a 
given round. Two exchanges are unique for i 
only  if  they involve  different relations. To 
identify domains we will need to distinguish 
e+  and e-  positions:  e+  positions  have more 
than e relations, and e -  positions have e or 
fewer.  In  Figures  3-5,  e +  positions  are 
boxes, e -  positions are circles. 
13 The three  B-D exchanges occurred  in three different 
experimental groups,  on  second,  third,  and  fourth 
rounds. In two cases, B received 12 points, in the third, 
11.  This  indicates that the  Bs  were  checking  their 
alternatives,  but quickly found  no reason  to continue  such 
explorations. 228  AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
There are two types of domains. A dyadic 
domain is two related e -  positions. A power 
domain is  a set of  one or more related e  + 
positions, along with all e -  positions related 
to any member  of this set. Formally, 
DOMAINS:  Given the set V of all positions 
on a path between i and j,  i and j are in 
the  same domain if  and only  if  there 
exists a path such that either (1)  V  = 
{  }, or (2)  all members of  V are e+ 
positions. 
For  example,  both  positions  in  the  one- 
exchange network of  Figure 3a  are in  the 
same domain since the set of positions (V) on 
the path  connecting  them is empty. They form 
a dyadic domain. Network 3b, in which e = 1, 
forms a  single-power domain: all  pairs of 
positions are either related or can be reached 
through a path containing only e  +  positions 
(boxes).  Network 3c  is  also a single-power 
domain and, as noted earlier, no position has 
a structural  advantage.  This shows that being 
an e + position is necessary but not sufficient 
to  produce high  power (Willer and Patton 
1987). Network 3d also forms a single-power 
domain. 
By comparing  3c to 3d, we can see how a 
change in one part of the power domain can 
have distal effects.  Note  that 3d  is  the 3c 
network with E added to the D position. In 
3c, A was in an equipower relation with B. 
But A becomes a low-power position when E 
is  attached. In  fact,  the  relative power of 
positions  in  all  relations  in  the  network 
change when E is added. 
We can draw  two implications  at this point. 
(1) If there is differential  power in a domain, 
then there is an e+  position. This yields the 
useful contrapositive  assertion:  the absence of 
e + positions implies no power differentiation. 
So for power to exist in a domain (or in a 
network,  for that matter),  at least one position 
must have an excess of available  partners.  (2) 
All  one-exchange networks form single do- 
mains. The reason will be clear as we next 
show that when e  >  1, a network can have 
multiple domains. 
(a)  (be 
A  B  B  A  C 
(d) 
A  B  C  D  A  B  C  D  E 
Fig.  3.  e  =  I 
When  e  >  1,  by  the  unique-exchange 
restriction, a position can exchange e  times 
only  if  it  has  e  or  more relations. Some 
positions-those  with  fewer  than  e  rela- 
tions-can  have effective maxima  less than e. 
Since e  =  2 in Figure  4a, for example, A can 
exchange twice, but B and C have effective 
maxima of one. 
In Figure 4a,  B-A-C now has two dyadic 
domains, (AB) and (AC); there is no core of 
one or more e+  positions. By the assertion 
given above, since there are no e+  positions, 
there is  no  power  differentiation. This  is 
reasonable  since neither B nor C is excluded 
from exchanging  with A in a given round. No 
position has excess  exchange opportunities, 
and no position may garner favorable profit 
divisions. The same logic holds, in fact, for 
chains  of  any  length,  including  the  4b 
network. This network contains four dyadic 
domains. 
The manifestation  of distal effects depends 
on the extent of domains. For instance, since 
B  and C  in  4a  are in  different domains, 
neither removing C nor adding new relations 
to C can affect B's  power, and vice  versa. 
The same is true for any two positions, e.g., 
B and D, lying in different  domains in the 4b 
chain. In contrast, 4c shows that attaching  F 
to the center of the 4b chain changes C from 
an e -  to  an e +  position-from  a circle  to  a 
box. This creates a (BCDF) domain. C now 
has power over B,  D,  and F  since  it  can 
exclude one of them in each round. Attaching 
a new position to D would remove C's power 
and benefit B,  further demonstrating  that B 
and D are in the same domain. 
Calculating  p(e) 
Every position in a multi-exchange network 
will have a p index for each of its domains: 
pid(ed) is  position i's  power in  domain d, 
under the  condition  that  i  can  make  ed 
exchanges per round within this domain. 
Let midk be the number of nonintersecting 
paths of length k from position i in domain d, 
(am)  (  (be 
(c)< 
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and h the longest such path from i  in that 
domain.  Only  paths  within  a  domain's 
boundaries  are counted. As illustrated  in the 
graphs,  each  path  begins  and  ends  with 
circles,  between which there are either no 
positions  or  only  boxes.  Position  i's  GPI 
within the domain is14 
h 
pid(ed)  =  [l/ed]  ,  (_  1)(k  1)  midk  (2) 
k=1 
p(e)  is  closely  related to p(l)  and similarly 
calculated.  Multiplying the  summation by 
l/ed simply places p(e) and  p(l)  values on the 
same scale. 
Let  us  apply  equation  2  (which  now 
substitutes  for Axiom 1) to network  4a, with e 
=  2.  The two dyadic domains are indicated 
by (AB) and (AC) subscripts.  We see that  PB 
=  PC  =  PA(AB)  =  P  A(AC) =  (1/1)(1)  =  1. 
Each position has,  in each of  its  domains, 
exactly  one  one-path  and  one  exchange. 
Therefore, A  has  no  power  advantage in 
either of its domains. Similar  results obtain in 
Figure 4b. 
The 4c network  has (AB) and (DE) dyadic 
domains and power domain (BCDF). Again, 
p  =  1  for  members of  dyadic  domains. 
However, for the power domain we calculate 
PC(BCDF) =  (1/2)(3) =  3/2, and for B, D, and 
F, p  =  (1/1)(l-1)  =  0.  Thus,  C  has  a 
power advantage  in both of its exchanges, B 
and  D  have  low  power  in  one  of  their 
exchanges and equal power in the other, A 
and  E  have  equal  power  in  their  one 
exchange, and F has low  power in its one 
exchange. 
We may also calculate an average power 
index, pi,  as the mean of  i's  indices across 
domains. In 4c, l  =  3/2; PA  =  PE =  1; PB 
-  PD  =  (1 +  0)/2  =  .5; PF  =  0. 
The  Figure 5a  network is  the  same  as 
Figure  2, but redrawn  using the circle and box 
notation.  When e  =  1, the network  is a single 
domain  and  only  the  Es  are  high-power 
positions. In 5b, where e  =  2, the situation  is 
drastically  altered. Only D has power advan- 
tages,  with  the  Es  all  having  low  power 
relative to D.  Furthermore,  the E-F relations 
form three equipower  dyadic domains. 
(a)  F1  El  D  E2  F2 
(b)  D  E2  2 
E3 
e  2 
F3 
Fig.  5 
The 5a  and 5b  networks tested the GPI 
generalization.  The two networks have iden- 
tical shapes. Only the number of exchanges 
per  round  differs.  Cook  et  al.'s  (1983) 
simulations found the Es  to  be  high-power 
positions in this network;  p(e)  concurs, but 
only for the special case of e  =  1. 
EXPERIMENT  2 
Experiment 2  tests  the  Figure 5  networks 
under  e =  1 and e =  2 conditions. In spite of 
their identical shape, our analysis indicates 
that these networks should exhibit radically 
different  profit distributions. 
Method 
Procedures  for this experiment  were similar  to 
those  used  in  Experiment 1.  In  this  case, 
however,  each  subject negotiated from the 
different network positions under both one- 
exchange and two-exchange conditions, con- 
trolling for  any  personal characteristics of 
subjects that might confound the test. 
Instructions  for the one- and two-exchange 
conditions  were  identical,  save  for  the 
14 For clarity, i subscripts  have been suppressed  for the 
e and h variables, d is suppressed  for h, and  Pid (ed)  will 
be  written as p(e)  or p.  Note  that Axiom  1  is  now 
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number of exchanges allowed per round. In 
the two-exchange condition only,  D  and E 
could  exchange  with  up  to  two  different 
partners  in the same round. 
Four groups were  run.  Each group had 
seven  subjects, one  for  each  of  the  seven 
network  positions. Two of the groups  had the 
one-exchange  condition first, followed by the 
two-exchange  condition.  The other  two groups 
had the order of  conditions reversed. As in 
the previous experiment, each subject occu- 
pied each network position over a series of 
four negotiation  rounds. The design produced 
a total of  224 negotiations, 112 under each 
exchange condition. 
After completing both parts of the experi- 
ment,  subjects were  paid according to  the 
number of  points  they  had  accumulated, 
around  $7.00 on average. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses apply to the Figure 
5  networks. All  are tested against the null 
hypotheses that every relation would average 
12-12 divisions. 
1.  In the one-exchange condition, the Es 
will exercise power over the Fs and D, and so 
the Es will all receive higher point totals than 
the others. 
2.  In the two-exchange condition, only D 
will  exercise  power.  D  will  obtain higher 
point accumulations  than the Es. 
3.  In  the  two-exchange  condition,  Es 
exchange  in  two  domains.  In  the  power 
domain, they will receive unfavorable  profit 
divisions with D.  In their respective dyadic 
domains, they will  receive  12-12  divisions 
with the Fs. 
Results 
Table  2a  and  Figure  6a  show  the  mean 
number of  profit points  obtained by  each 
position under the  one-exchange condition. 
The position labels for Figure 5a are also the 
5.25  6.52 
18.77  17.89 
4.93 
(a)  e=1 
18.  17 
6.08 
12.15  11.90 
11.85  12.10 
5.89  5.88 
17.88 




Fig.  6.  Results of a Second Experiment 
column headings of Table 2a. The Es clearly 
obtained favorable profits,  around an  18-6 
split on the average. The t-tests show that the 
Es' profits were significantly greater than a 
12-12  split.  Moreover,  the  Es  exercised 
power over both D and the Fs. Hypothesis 1 
is supported. 
Table 2b and Figure  6b show results for the 
two-exchange  condition.  Now  the  power 
relationships have  been  reversed from  the 
one-exchange condition, with the Es losing 
power and D gaining. As was the case for the 
Es under the one-exchange condition, D was 
able to gain approximately 18-6 profit divi- 
sions-significantly  greater than the  12-12 
split. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted  equipower  relations 
between the Es and their adjacent Fs under 
two-exchange conditions. The Es and the Fs 
should then have 12-12 profit-point  divisions. 
As  Table  2b  shows,  the  12-12  split  was 
approximated.  None of the differences were 
significant. Hypothesis 3  is  also supported. 
Table 2a.  Second Experiment:  Profit by Position, One-Exchange  Condition 
Position 
D  El  E2  E3  F,  F2  F3 
mean profit  4.93  18.77  17.89  18.17  5.25  6.52  6.08 
s.d.  4.55  4.58  4.82  4.64  4.56  4.86  4.65 
t  13.65  15.53  12.91  13.87  13.65  10.64  11.66 
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Table 2b.  Second Experiment: Profit by  Domain and 
Position, Two-Exchange  Condition 
Power Domain  D-El  D-E2  D-E3 
mean profit  18.05  18.12  17.43 
s.d.  4.61  4.50  4.65 
t  11.66  11.63  9.77 
Note: D's profit shown, E's profit =  24  -  D's.  All 
results significant at p< .001,  1-tailed. 
Dyadic Domains 
El-F, 
E2-F2  E3-F3 
mean profit  12.15  11.90  12.08 
s.d.  1.46  1.46  .73 
t  1.05  .72  1.17 
Note: E's  profit shown, F's  profit  =  24-E's.  No 
significant  test results. 
In  sum,  this experiment provided strong 
support for the hypotheses testing the GPI 
generalization to  multi-exchange networks. 
The presence of  domains within the larger 
network under the two-exchange conditions 
strongly influenced the exchanges transpiring 
within those domains. As  far as we  know, 
such  phenomena  are  not  anticipated by 
alternative  network-exchange  theories. 
NEW THEORETICAL  DIRECTIONS 
In addition to  making its  predictions more 
precise, the formality  of our theory has made 
it easier to  develop extensions. We  briefly 
note  five  that  are  in  varying  stages  of 
development  and corroboration. 
M-Exchange  Networks 
After developing the p(e) model, we discov- 
ered that, with no loss of precision, different 
positions may seek different maximum num- 
bers of  exchanges per round-what  we call 
the  "M-Exchange" condition.  This  admits 
networks  in which actors may seek exchange 
in one,  some,  or all of  their relations. No 
reformulation  of  the GPI is  needed to deal 
with this extension. The analysis predicts a 
new class of previously unanticipated  power 
shifts. 
No-Round  Exchange 
Allowing nonunique  exchanges lets positions 
exchange more than once per round within 
relations. This effectively eliminates the need 
for exchange rounds. This is the M-Exchange 
No-Round  condition. Now i may exchange up 
to ej times or until those to which it is related 
have exchanged up to  their limits.  Though 
this is a more complex situation,  it is still true 
that only e-  positions can have low power 
and only e+  positions can have high power. 
Resource-Pool Values 
If  resource  pools  are  different  sizes  in 
different  relations,  then  there  is  another 
source for network breaks (Bonacich 1987b; 
Willer and Patton 1987). For example, in the 
one-exchange B-A-C network, let B  and A 
negotiate over the division of 30 points, while 
A  and C negotiate over 10. At first A will 
benefit from the bids of B and C. Eventually 
C will offer 9 points to A, keeping 1. Then B 
will offer 10 to A, keeping 20. C cannot  meet 
this bid  and still receive profit. Therefore, 
exchange  should  continue  exclusively  be- 
tween B  and A,  with C excluded from the 
network. With the loss  of  C,  only an A-B 
dyad remains  and profits should reach  a 15-15 
split. Thus, power relations can be affected 
by variations  in resource-pool  values. 
Flow-Networks 
So  far,  we  have  focused  on  exchange 
conditions  under  which  resources  cannot 
transfer across relations. We  have done so 
primarily  because this is the condition under 
which  most  of  the  relevant research was 
conducted. However, as others  have indicated 
(Marsden  1983;  Bonacich  1987a),  it  is 
worthwhile  to  relax  this  restriction  and 
consider  networks  with  transferable  re- 
sources-those  in which resources may flow 
through  positions. 
A consequence of extending into the realm 
of flow-networks is that positions may have 
power  over  others to  which  they  are not 
related, depending on the initial distributions 
of resources and on which actors seek which 
resources. This is similar to Marsden's  view. 
The foremost difference between that view 
and  our  approach is  that  we  incorporate 
explicit assumptions  about individual negoti- 
ation  strategies and  the  conditions of  ex- 
change-factors  that  affect  exchange  out- 
comes, breaks, and domains. 
Positive Connection 
While negative connections place an upper 
limit on the number  of exchanges in which a 232  AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL  REVIEW 
"hub"  position  may  engage  per  round, 
positive connections place a lower limit on 
the  number  of  exchanges  in  which  the 
position  must  engage  to  realize  a  profit 
(Patton 1986). An example is the manufac- 
turer who must obtain all  components for a 
synthetic  product  before that  product  becomes 
a  viable  source of  revenue. New  research 
shows that the exchange dynamics that occur 
in positive connections differ markedly from 
those in negatively connected networks, and 
power advantages  belong to peripheral  posi- 
tions in branches such as B-A-C (Patton and 
Willer 1987). This work on positive connec- 
tions  only  begins  to  uncover  a  range  of 
phenomena  at least as broad  and interesting  as 
those associated with negative connections. 
CONCLUSION 
Our  findings indicate  that  by only focusing on 
the  effects  of  networks per  se,  alternative 
network  theories do not recognize that power 
and resource  distributions  depend as much on 
prevailing exchange conditions as they do on 
configurations  of positions and relations. We 
introduced  a  model  that  considers  both 
structural form  and  exchange  conditions, 
anticipating  and explaining such phenomena 
as relative power, network breakage, power 
reversals and  domain-specific effects.  The 
studies that we described are only the first of 
many  that  could  investigate  stability  and 
instability  in exchange networks. 
Future  developments  aside, we have found 
the present incarnation of  the  theory quite 
useful  for  understanding many  real-world 
power struggles in exchange networks-from 
international  disputes over geographical  con- 
trol  to toddlers'  negotiations  over the sharing  of 
playthings.  Whatever the  application, the 
theory directs us to specify the relevant  actors 
and resources, identify other pertinent rela- 
tions in which the actors  are engaged, observe 
who  seeks  exchange  with  whom,  identify 
which  actors  risk  exclusion  from  valued 
resources, consider temporal  constraints  such 
as  ultimatums or  deadlines that create ex- 
change rounds and, in general, determine  the 
extent to which the exemplar  departs  from the 
idealized scope conditions of the theory. 
Our work also  has  implications for two 
very general questions that are relevant to 
structural  approaches:  (1) what is the appro- 
priate unit of analysis for structural  theories; 
and (2) how are characteristics  of  structures 
and the  social  units within them mutually 
determined? 
Regarding  the first question, we eschew the 
designation of  one  unit of  analysis as,  in 
general, more or less  appropriate  than an- 
other. Our theory explains certain actor and 
network  behaviors. In any given instance, the 
network may be an organization, as may the 
actor. It follows that  actors  may or may not be 
individual  persons. All that matters  is that the 
units considered have the necessary proper- 
ties.  Therefore,  no  unit  of  analysis  is 
generally  most  appropriate for  structural 
approaches. 
We can offer no universal solution to the 
question of how social structures  and constit- 
uent units each determine properties of  the 
other. Our approach  does, however, point to 
excludability  as a linchpin securing  individual 
and network realms. That is,  structures  and 
exchange conditions at times bar some actors 
from procuring  the resources they value and 
desire. Thus, power happens to those whose 
positions allow them to dodge the struggle to 
avoid exclusion. 
As the foregoing review of extensions-in- 
progress implies, we  do not claim that our 
theory is  finished or unimprovable. Nor do 
we  claim  that  it  explains  all  phenomena 
within the  purview of  alternative formula- 
tions.  It  is,  however,  consistent with  the 
findings of all previous experimental  research 
on  exchange  networks.  Moreover,  it  ad- 
dresses a range of  conditions and generates 
predictions  that are either  beyond the range of 
alternative  formulations  or simply contradict 
them,  depending upon how  one  interprets 
their scope. Our long-term  goal is to continue 
incremental  extensions and systematic  tests of 
increasingly refined network-exchange  mod- 
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APPENDIX 
The Axiomatic Theory 
Sybls: 
i,  j  :  actors  in  relation  i--i 
V  :all  positions  related  to  i,  other  than  j 
Z  :all  positions  related  to  j,  other  than  i 
v  :a  member of  V 
z  :a  member of  Z 
rii  :resources  received  by  i  from  j  from  an  exchange 
Pi  :  i's  power  index 
Pij  Pi  _  pi 
Eij  :  i  and  j  exchange 
Sij  :  i  seeks  exchange  with  j 
k  empirical  constant 
Logical  Operators: 
x  & y  conjunction  ("x  and  y") 
x  or  y  inclusive  disjunction  ("x  and/or  y") 
-x  negation  ("not  x") 
x  --->  y  :implication  ("If  x,  then  y") 
x  <-->  y  :biconditional  ("x  if  and  only  if  y") 
(x)  :universal  quantifier  ("For  all  x  such  that  .. 
(Ox)  :existential  quantifier  ("There  is  an  x  such  that  .. 
Scope  Conditions  for  Relations 
SC 5.  (i  ) ( j)  (v)  (S iv  or  Sij  ) 
SC6.  (i)(j)[Eij  --->  (rij  +  rji  =  k)],  k  >  0; 
(i)(j)[-Eij  --->  (rij  +  rji  =  0)] 
SC7.  (i)(j){Eij  <-->  [(rij  > 0)  &  (rji  >  0)1] 
Axioms 
A1.  (i)(pi  ...)  (see  equations  1  and  2  in  text) 
A2.  (i)(j){Sij  <-->  [(pij  > pji)  or  (v)(pij  > piv)]} 
A3.  (i)(j)[Eij  --->  (Sjj  & Sji)] 
A4.  (i)(j){Ei  j  ---  >  [(pi  > pi)  <  --- >  (rij  >  r ji)]} 
Theorems 
Ti.  (i)(j)[(V  =  I  }-->  Sijj] 
T2.  (i)(j)[(-Sij  or  -Sjj)  --->  -Eij] 
T3.  (i)(j){-Sij  <-->  [(Pij  < pji)  &  (Bv)(pij  <  Piv)]} 
T4.  (i)(j){[(pij  < pji)  & (3v)(pij  < piv)]  or 
[(Pui  ?<  Pi)  &  (3z)(pji  <  piz)]  --->  -EiA} 
Proofs  * 
Theorem  1 
(1)  V =  {  }  premise  (P) 
(2)  -Siv  (1),  definition  of  V 
(3)  -(]v)Siv  (2),  Interchange  of  Quantifiers  (IQ) 
(4)  (Bv)(Siv  or  Sij)  SC5 
________________________ 
Sij  (3),  (4),  disjunctive  syllogism 
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Theorem 2 
(1)  -Sij  or  -Sji  P 
(2)  -(Sij  & Sji)  (1),  DeMorgan's  Law (DL) 
(3)  Eij  --->  (S13  & Sji)  A3 
_______________________________ 
-Eij  (2),  (3),  modus tollens  (MT) 
Theorem 3 
(1)  -Si3  P 
(2)  [(ps.  >  pji)  or  (v)(pij  >  piv)]  ---->  Sij  A2,  Biconditional  Law  (BL) 
(3)  -[(pij  > pji)  or  (v)(pij  > piv)]  (1),  (2),  MT 
(4)  -(pi-j  > pji)  & -(v)(pij  > piv)  (3),  DL 
(5)  -(pij  >  pji)  (4),  Law  of  Simplification 
(6)  -(v)(pij  >  piv)]  (4),  Law  of  Simplification 
(7)  pij  < pji  (5),  Law for  Inequalities 
(8)  (Bv)(pij  <  piv)  (6),  IQ 
__________________________________________ 
(pij  <  pji)  &  (3v)(pij  <  piv)  (7),  (8),  Law  of  Adjunction 
Theorem 4 
(1)  [(pij  < pji)  & (3v)(pij  < piv)]  or  P 
[(pji  <  pij)  &  (3z)(pji  <  pjz)] 
(2)  (pij  < pji)  <-->  -(i)-(j)(pij  > pji)  Law for  Inequalities  (LI), 
Double  Negation  (DN) 
(3)  (pji  <  pij)  <-->  -(j)-(i)(pji  >  Pi)  LI,  DN 
(4)  (3v)(pij  <  piv)  <->  (v)(pij  >  plv)  LI,  DN,  IQ 
(5)  (3z)(Pji  <  piz)  <->-(z)(pji  >  Piz)  LI,  DN,  IQ 
(6)  [-(pij  > pji)  & -(pij  > piv)]  or  (2),  (3),  (4),  (5)  substituted 
[-(pji  > PI)  & -(pji  > Piz)]  into  (1) 
(7)  [-(pij  >  pji)  & -(pij  >  piv)]  --->  DL 
-[(pis  > pji)  or  (pij  > piv)] 
(8)  [-(pji  > pis)  & -(psi  > pjz)]  --->  DL 
-[(pji  > piu)  or  (pjl  > piz)] 
(9)  -[(pij  > psi)  or  (pij  > piv)]  or  (6),  (7),  (8) 
-[(pi  > pij)  or  (pji  > psz)] 
(10)  Sij  <-->  ((piu  >  psi)  or  (piu  >  piv)]  A2 
(11)  Sii  <>  [(pji  >  pis)  or  (psi  >  psz)]  A2 
(12)  (Sij  & Sji)  <-->  (10),  (11) 
([(pij  >  pjj)  or  (v)(pij  >  piv)]  & 
[(psi  > pi5)  or  (z)(psi  > p5z)]) 
(13)  -(S's  & Si)  (9),  (12) 
(14)  -Sis  or  -Sji  (13),  DL 
_ -____________(14),___________________T2______ 
-Eij  (14),  T2 POWER  IN NETWORKS  235 
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